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Nigerian Stock Market Reflection Of The
Global Financial Crisis: An Evaluation

By A. A. Sere-Ejembi, Ph. D

“...The fruit of... Greed... Dishonesty in
the finance sector dragged us here...
” - Joseph Stiglitz
1.0
INTRODUCTION
With its roots in banking, the sub-prime
mortgage crisis that commenced in the
United States in 2007 soon resonated in
other sectors of its financial system, and
the economy, at large. It spread quickly to
the developed economies in Europe,
including the United Kingdom, and Asia with Japan becoming well affected. The
emerging economies were not isolated. A
transmission channel of the global
financial crisis, which has been referred to
as the “Globalised Synchronized
Slowdown” is the stock market. Around the
world stock market indicators started
falling.
The capital market, vis-à-vis the stock
market, is a channel through which
national economies receive foreign capital
flows that make their tendency towards the
global economy easily visible.
Developments in the market thus become
a reflection of global financial
developments. The level of
responsiveness, however, depends on the
level of development, exposure and
insulation of the domestic market from the
vagaries of the international.
In the case of the Nigerian stock market,
following initial relative insulation, the
speed of contagion and response was
comparatively slower. However, the
effects began to manifest in the first
quarter of 2008. All market indicators
1

commenced a downward spiral. Negative
market growth ensued. It persists. The
objective of this paper, therefore, is to
review the global financial crisis, in the
context of its recent effects on the Nigerian
stock market. The timeliness and
significance of this subject is in view of the
un-salutary resonance that the plunging
trends, if not reversed, could have on
economic development through stifling the
productive sectors' access to lower cost
equity capital, amongst others. To this end,
the rest of the paper is organised as
follows: Section 2 highlights background
issues on the global financial crisis, while
section 3 contains a review of relevant
empirical literature; Section 4 outlines the
resonance of the crisis on the Nigerian
stock market; Section 5 analyses recent
movements in key indicators of the market;
Section 6 presents current policy options
and perspective measures in resolution;
and Section 7 summarises and concludes.
2.0
B A C K G R O U N D TO T H E
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
In the wake of the US government bid to
boost housing was a policy error that
permitted sub-prime clientele unrestricted
access to mortgage finance. Combined
with the thriving derivatives market, the
horizon for credit expansion widened to
unprecedented levels. The result was
private over-borrowing accompanied by
an internal debt crisis. Perhaps one could
justifiably fault the US government for
failing to prevent the sub-prime mortgage
bubble bust. However, what could have
been done is a complex question, since
the problem was not in liberalization as
such, but combined with the absence of
effective regulation and supervision.
Properly enforced prudential limits on
exposure could have helped mitigate the
effects of the over-ambitious and
excessive risk-taking, contain the defaults
and limit the spread. As long as capital
flows and credit expansion grew
unchecked, lending expectedly spilt over
from financing safe and productive
investments to risky and speculative
assets. Reckless financial innovations
included leveraging, short selling,

unsecured credit systems and swaps
attributed. The loose monetary policy in
the aftermath of September 11, 2001
terrorist incidence in the US, in the bid to
forestall a depressed economy further
exacerbated.
Agreeably, housing prices had trended
upwards for ten consecutive years, up to
2004, enticing speculators, fuelling and
prolonging the farce. Mortgagees
perfected imprudent lending practices.
Dove-tailing into the derivative market,
including securitization, sale and re-sale of
issued and re-issued sub-prime loans to
secondary mortgage markets created a
bubble that was sure to bust. After
mortgagees booked sub-prime
mortgages, they packaged them into
Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) and
sold them to institutions, central of which
were the US government Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac) now bankrupt.
The intent was to enable the banks to free
up funds to further lend to more
prospective homeowners. Precisely, this
singular action removed a constraint from
the balance sheets of the banks, made
them less concerned about the credit
growth, paths and risks, while ensuring
that, in addition, qualified borrowers were
not stifled of mortgages. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac repackaged the loans and
sold them to investors and financial
institutions around the world, who in turn
repeated the securitization along a chain;
widening exposure and spreading the
scope for contagion and imminent
collapse. In furtherance, some home
owners, including the sub-prime, enticed
by the lure of the accelerating asset price
appreciation, refinanced their homes at
lower rates, took out multiple (second,
third, etc) mortgages against the added
value and expanded other consumer
spending. Satisfaction from the booming
bubble was all-encompassing.
Commencing in 2006, a combination of
other factors started taking a toll.
Prominent were the chronic expansionary
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fiscal policy in the face of self-inflicted and
natural disasters (“Nuclear Weapon
Search War' with Iraq, Afghanistan war,
Hurricane Katrina, etc) and the two “Fs”
(food crisis from bio fuels, grains shortages
and rising prices; and fuel crisis from
upward trending costs of energy and
international oil price). These combined
with the monetary ease that the
September 11, 2001 attack on the twin
towers, culminated in stifling households
and businesses (especially the small
business), and increasing unemployment.
This led to the third “F” (financial crisis).
The macroeconomic turbulence translated
to increasing default by mortgage owners
aiding foreclosures (Fiakpa et al, 2008),
specifically amongst the sub-prime. Rising
foreclosure rates coupled with sustained
and, in aspects, increasing supply ushered
in price declines. Refinancing became
constrained with the nose-diving prices.
These developments encouraged
defaults, further. In paradox, responding,
the lending institutions unwisely reset to
higher interest rates and payments.
Facing negative equity from declines in
home market value, the choice to stop
mortgage service became pervasive.
Fiakpa et al (2008) analysed that as at
March 2006, the value of the U.S. subprime mortgages was estimated at $1.3
trillion; by March 2007, approximately 16
per cent of these had become 90-day
delinquent; and they were in foreclosure
proceedings by October 2007. By the next
quarter, in January 2008, the delinquency
rate had risen to 21 per cent and by May
2008 it hit 25 per cent. Though the subprime only represented 6.8 percent of the
loans outstanding in the U.S, they
represented 43.0 per cent of the
foreclosures during third quarter 2007.
3.0
A SURVEY OF RELEVANT
EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Empirical studies have revealed that the
US housing bubble burst was not without
early warning (Kritayanavaj, 2008), which
none the less was ignored. Shuttleworth
(2008) stressed that during the period of
boom, financial institutions, their
supporting ideologues, politicians and
regulators would not want to hear of
caution or regulation as now being
advocated. That would have been anticapitalism. It was all done in the name of
innovation, and any regulatory initiative
was ignored with claims that it would
suppress innovation. Even, then the
dwindling regulatory capacity could not
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have kept pace. Fiakpa et al (2008) also
attested that supported by the digital age,
some of America's brightest were devoting
talents to circumventing standards and
traditional regulation regimes designed to
ensure the safety of the financial system.
Power without control produced natural
results, as expected, with the loss of
balance between financial market
liberalization and financial regulation.
After all, the BASEL II Accord ensured
some degree of self-regulation. Booker
(2008) pointed out that it proposed a
drastic tightening of the so-called “fair
value” or "mark-to-market" rules.
Depository and other financial institutions
self-defined whether they were solvent
and fit to continue trading. If not, they were
to self-declare to the regulatory
authorities. This provision successfully hid
the fuelled appetite for outsized risks and
entrenching downturn in the market before
regulatory authorities even noticed. The
rules of BASEL II are set up to ensure that
the greater risk to which a bank is exposed,
the greater the amount of capital the bank
needed to hold to safeguard its solvency
and overall economic stability. However,
the provisions of Pillar 3, which rest on the
disclosures that the bank must make to
allow the market have a better picture of its
overall risk position is a major loophole that
the failed financial institutions exploited.
The idea was that there would be better
transparency in banks' public reporting
that would encourage prudent
management. On the contrary, the selfdisclosure clause gave opportunity for
concealment.
In Centre for Research and Globalization
(2008), Professor Prabaht Patnaik, Centre
for Economic Studies and Planning at
India submitted that the cause of the
problem was located in the fundamental
defect of the free market system. This
related to its capacity to distinguish
between “enterprise” and “speculation”.
Hence, as supported by Kritayanavaj
(2008), the tendency was the domination
by speculators, interested not in the longterm yield of assets but only in the shortterm speculative appreciation in values.
Earlier, The Economist (2005) in The
Global Housing Boom forecasted that the
worldwide rise in home prices was the
biggest bubble in history, and called for
preparedness for severe economic pain
when it busted. Other economic experts
gave support and predicted that the US
sub-prime mortgage expansion, with its
5

exotic and over ambitious derivative
instruments, when reversed, would trigger
a meltdown across the global financial
system - the stock market inclusive.
4.0
RESONANCE OF THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON THE
NIGERIAN STOCK MARKET
UNECA, African Development Bank and
African Development Fund (2008)
Ministerial Conference on the Financial
Crisis had argued that with the
comparative shallowness of the financial
sector of African economies, including
Nigeria's, and the illiquid capital markets,
the system is weakly linked to the
international financial system. Total share
of stock market capitalization stood at 1.81
per cent of global. Banks inactivity in the
derivative market and varied residual
controls on capital accounts contributed to
some insulation from severe contagion
effects, as witnessed in advanced
economies. The Ministerial Conference on
the Financial Crisis (2008), then submitted
that vulnerability, nonetheless, came
through some financial linkages, including
the receipt of approximately US$15.73
billion in portfolio flows in 2007. Portfolio
flows were then estimated to have
declined to US$5.7 billion in 2008. Given
the small size of the market, even small
declines would lead to appreciable
volatility.
Resonating of the eruption of the global
financial crisis, one issue that agitates with
the crash in the Nigerian stock market
prices, in March 2008, is the subsequent
plummeting of other major indicators to
date. Risk-averse institutional and
individual foreign investors commenced
divestment, also to compensate for loss of
investment in the global markets. Local
investors then supported with panic
disposal. The tightness in the balance
sheets of the deposit money banks
(DMBs) and counter-party risk assisted.
Hitherto, particularly during the preceding
three-year period, the Nigerian market had
been exceptionally bullish, with share
prices soaring. It is worthy to note,
however, that not owing to the global
financial crisis and the speculative subprime mortgage bubbles and bust alone,
other contributory factors lent support.
Some of these, namely, margin lending by
the DMBs, stock price appreciation that
had no correlation with the fundamentals
in the quoting companies and local
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investors' opting to invest in foreign capital
markets to take advantage of the low stock
prices, could be seen, on their own part, as
domestic response mechanism to the high
risk taking tendencies in the global
financial market.
Antecedents of the opening up of the
Nigerian stock market, its bullish growth,
reversal and subsequent bearish trends
are presented in the next paragraph.
4.1
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
THE NIGERIAN STOCK MARKET
In 1996, the submissions of the Dennis
Odife Panel laid the foundation for the
internationalization of the Nigerian stock
market. The reforms that followed
promoted a more efficient and virile capital
market, pivotal to meeting the nation's
economic and development aspirations in
the new millennium. Backing-up the
opening up the market and exposure of the
local investment climate to the
international, were the removals of
restrictions on foreign ownership of
assets, loosening up of foreign exchange,
interest rate and other controls and
rigidities. The introduction of the
Automated Trading System (ATS); the
Central Securities Clearing System
(CSCS) becoming operational in 1997; the
removal of the fundamental elements of
financial repression that had hampered
capital inflows; electronic clearing,
dematerialization of transactions,
settlement and delivery; and availability of
audit trail data began meeting international
standards. Transaction processes were
thence eased and foreign investors'
confidence in the market surfaced. Earlier,
the 1995 Nigerian Investment Promotion
Commission (NIPC) Decree had
liberalised the economy, by permitting
unrestricted foreign investment in quoted
companies in Nigeria. Strong Government
commitment to the internationalization
process encouraged it to reduce its direct
interference in the operations of the capital
market and allowed the market to develop
at its own pace. Hence, it engendered
strengthening of the surveillance function
of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (Odoko, 1998).
Adeyemi (1998), Emenuga (1998),
Obadan (1998) and Onosode (1998)
heralded the reformed Nigerian capital
market, being that properly functioning
stock markets contribute positively to
economic development through the
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creation of medium to long term capital.
Well-pronounced stock market
development and opening up, however,
materialised with the implementation of
the 2004 Central Bank of Nigeria Banking
Sector Reform Agenda at which basis laid
the re-capitalization of the Nigerian
banking sector (Sere-Ejembi, 2008). With
the banking sector taking the consistent
lead as part of the top ten stocks in the
market, the Agenda itself was a positive
development and timely intervention that
better equipped the domestic banks to
weather other more serious effects of the
current global meltdown (Soludo, 2008).
The banks' response was to raise funds
through the stock market, not only from
local, but from international investors as
well. This effectively broke down the
barriers to capital flows, which the Nigerian
Stock Exchange had been struggling to
achieve since the Odife Panel.
International fund managers perceived the
attractiveness of the market (opportunities
and higher yields available); thereby
making foreign portfolio investment inflow
surge.
Murinde (2006) presented that some
authors, notably Kim and Singal (2000)
who had hypothesized that opening
up to foreign investors invariably
exposed domestic markets to
unfavourable external shocks,
increasing stock price volatility and
consequently raising the cost of
capital as shareholders demand
higher risk premium. However, they
and other authors, quoting Richards
(1996), Chan et al (1990) and Airken
(1998), failed to find enough evidence
to substantiate the hypothesis. The
submission, therefore, is that even
with possibilities of contagion,
appropriate supervisory, regulatory
and legal frameworks, as well as
transparency, good corporate
governance and presence of
fundamentals in quoted companies' stock
price appreciation during the bullish
period, would have served as needed
insulator. Internationalization, thus,
remains a positive development.
5.0
ANALYSIS OF THE NIGERIAN
STOCK MARKET RESPONSE
5.1
METHODOLOGY
To capture the effects of the global
financial meltdown on the domestic stock
market, this section examines the
outcomes of trading activities, by
6

descriptively analyzing movements in the
major indicators of performance, of the
Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE), which is
a self regulatory body and the statutory
stock market of the Nigeria capital market.
The analysis focuses on monthly market
developments from January 2007 to
December 2008, being the period of
pronouncement of the global crisis. The
sources of data are the monthly bulletins of
the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the NSE and the Trade and
Exchange Department (TED) of the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).
5.2
I N D I C AT O R S O F
PERFORMANCE
The Appendix contains the tables of the
data utilized. Activities on the floor of the
NSE were particularly impressive in 2007.
Sluggish trading commenced in March
2008, coinciding with the period of
widespread credit contraction in the
developed financial markets, in the light of
deteriorating balance sheets. Aggregate
market indices nose-dived and continued
dropping till end-2008, as the bears
continued their hold on the market. This
was attributable to the indices of the
quoted blue-chip companies despite the

impressive financials posted by most
(Securities and Exchange Commission,
2008). The paradox underscores the point.
Most probably, a major contributory factor
is that some of the stock market drivers
were unrelated to the performance of the
quoted companies and the domestic
financial market.
The data on inflow and outflow of capital
from portfolio investment between
January and December 2008 lend
credence.
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nine of the months recorded
positive growth of as much as 26.2
per cent in April 2007. Meanwhile,
nine of the months in 2008
beginning from March had varying
degrees of negative growth of
between 0.03 per cent in May and
19.99 per cent recorded in
October.

5.2.1
All Share Index
Reflecting the months of global
perception that the Nigerian stock
market had favourable growth
potentials, the all Share Index (ASI) of
the NSE recorded an increasing trend
from 37,764.5 at the beginning of the
review period up till August 2007, when
it dipped slightly. The positive growth
however picked up during the next
quarter to peak at 65,653.4 in February
2008. From then, in response to the
deepening global crisis, the Nigerian
stock market witnessed substantial
divestment by foreign investors. The
ASI reflected the bearish market till
end-2008. It crashed to a 24-month low
of 31,450.8 (Figure 1).

5.2.3
Volume and Value of
Stocks
Movements in both volume and
value of stocks in the secondary
segment reflected the downturn in
March 2008. In Figure 5 the left
axis presents the value, while the
right the volume of stocks traded.
Short-lived attempts at recovery occurred

in July and August 2008, with expectations

Figure 2 further underscores the effects of
the global financial crisis on growth in the
ASI. Growth has been largely negative
since March 2008. Coinciding with the
collapse of the age-long Lehman
Brothers, and explicit pronouncement by
the US government about the crisis,
October 2008 recorded the largest decline
of 21.4 per cent.
5.2.2
Market Capitalization
Similar to the movement observed in the
ASI, Market Capitalization at the NSE
peaked at N12.50 trillion in February 2008
(Figure 3). The trend maintained a
reversal from March till the market closed
at N6.96 trillion at end-December 2008.
Between March 2008 and the end of year,
the market has lost N5.55 trillion in market
capitalization, amounting to 44.4 per cent.
Figure 4 displays the monthly percentage
growth in Market Capitalization. In 2007,

that the situation would improve. In
general, the pattern of movements
mirrored those of the ASI and Market
Capitalization. From a peak of N283
billion in January 2008, the value of stocks
traded slumped to a record 24-month low
of N44.3 billion at the year end. Similarly,
7

the volume of traded stock declined from
its peak of 27.7 billion in February 2008 to
close at 9.7 in December 2008.
5.2.4Number of Deals
Movement in the number of deals, in
addition, revealed the bears in the
stock market during the last three
quarters of 2008. The horizontal zero
level growth displays this clearly.
October 2008 witnessed a 20-month
low negative growth of 40 per cent.
Ignoring the sharp attempt at recovery
in November, the indicator plummeted
anew, by 27.4 per cent in December.
5.3 P O R T F O L I O C A P I T A L
IMPORTATION AND CAPITAL
OUTFLOW
Capital for portfolio investment flowed
in, amounting to US$436.98 million in
January 2008. The effects of the
meltdown are gleaned from the low levels
of inflow, of US$111.53 and US$133.12,
i n S e p t e m b e r a n d N o v e m b e r,
respectively (Figure 7). Overall, capital
outflow from the system increased from
US$1,687.48 in 2007 to US$ 1,702.88 in
2008 (Table 1).

6.0
POLICY RESPONSE AND
OPTIONS IN RESOLUTION
Certain policy response mechanisms to
the current impasse have been put in
place by the institutional arrangements
connected to, and within the stock
market. While the list is not exhaustive,
even with expected response lag in
policy, the adequacy of the options is
debatable in the face of continuing
trends. It is important to examine these
first, before presenting the proposals to
slow down and resolve re-occurrence.
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which, in another dimension, increased
the exposure of the DMBs.

Commission
reduced it own
fees by 50 per
cent, and
mandated the
NSE as well
as other
capital market
operators to
r e d u c e
likewise.

6.1 POLICY RESPONSE TO ARREST
THE DOWNTURN
6.1.1 F e d e r a l G o v e r n m e n t
Constituted Presidential Advisory
Team on the Capital Market
The mandate of the Presidential
Advisory Team set up in August 2008,
was to regularly deliberate on measures
that would assist the speedy reversal of
plummeting activities and indicators in
the capital market. This pronouncement
by the FG encouraged the policy
responses by the statutory apex
regulator, SEC, and self-regulating NSE.
6.1.2 Security and Exchange
Commission Renewed Market and
Guidelines
To reduce the costs of access to the
market, the Securities and Exchange

6 . 1 . 3
Nigerian
Stock
Exchan
g
e
Review
of Rules
The NSE
reviewed
trading
rules to
enforce
z e r o
tolerance for infractions. It curtailed
limits on share buy-back to 15 per cent
and de-listed the age-long moribund
companies. Maximum limit on daily price
movement was put at 5 per cent either
way from October.
6.2 PERSPECTIVE MEASURES TO
ARREST DOWNTURNS
6.2.1 Innovative, Forward-looking
and Strengthened Regulation
The global financial crisis brought to fore
the need to appropriately strengthen
market regulation. To ensure stability, a
robust regulation should be pre-emptive
not reactionary. Central to this is the
control of high risk approaches to trade.
An example is the margin trading that
could have been curtailed early; and
8

6.2.2 Enhanced and Proactive
Supervision
This involves closer supervision of the
various institutions in the market,
including the operators as well as the
quoted companies. Clamping down on
companies whose stock prices
appreciate without corresponding
fundamentals in operational
performance could be, firstly by a
written warning to the Management of
the institution, and eventually by way of
suspension from the market - if default
continues.
6.2.4 Modified Legal Framework
To protect the domestic financial system,
and engender some level of immunity to
future international crisis, the legal
framework for capital in- and outflow
needs a review. Understandably though,
the modifications should not serve to
constrain foreign flows unduly, or place
the Nigerian economy at a competitive
disadvantage in the global arena.
6.2.4 Advocacy for Domestic
Drivers of Growth
A quick fix solution to initiate recovery is
strong advocacy of local institutional
investors, through confidence building
and assurances that the stock market
will rebound, first by looking inwards to
the domestic economy. In the current
dispensation, the importance of
domestic drivers of growth cannot be
over-emphasized. Without a return to
the market, and boost in domestic
mobilization to support investment and
market growth, it will not regenerate and
foreign investors will not be attracted.
The capital market regulatory authorities
need to speedily stimulate, revitalize and
boost local investor confidence.
6.2.5 C a l l f o r G r e a t e r
Tr a n s p a r e n c y i n P r e s e n t i n g
Accounts by Quoted Companies and
Public Enlightenment on
Fundamentals
The need for heavy sanctions on both
external and internal auditors that
misrepresent the position of quoted
companies, in the bid make them
attractive, cannot be over-emphasized.
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Onus then rests with the supervisory,
regulatory and policy making organs,
and other stakeholders to adequately
enlighten the Nigerian public on proper
capital market investment decision
making. There is need to stall the bandwagon effect in stock acquisition and
entrench objective and sound selection
criteria. Rather than mere following
superficial price movements, the
investor should seek to examine the
fundamentals underlying the
movements.
7.0 SUMMARYAND CONCLUSION
The current global financial crisis that
emanated from the US sub-prime
mortgage bubble bust is the worst global
downturn since the 1930s, bringing
turmoil to world's financial sectors the
Nigerian stock market inclusive. With the
inter-dependency of the financial
markets, albeit to varying degrees,

though the Nigerian market has made
tremendous progress to strengthen in
recent years, especially with its
internationalization, it could not have
remained completely immune to the
exogenous shocks. In view of the
important role of the market to the
country's economic development, the
contagion effects cannot be ignored.
Even if they could not have been
completely averted, there could have
been in-built mechanisms to mitigate
and dampen the severity.

drivers of growth; as well as call for
greater transparency in presenting
accounts by quoted companies; and
public enlightenment on fundamentals.
Expectedly, owing to empirically proven
cyclical patterns of economic
development, there will be future crisis.
However, the contagion effect on
economies will depend on
preparedness. Fundamentally, to curtail
severe contagion is to improve on the
macroeconomic policy environment.
This is critical to influencing the
performance of the capital market in
general and the stock market, in
particular. The time to commence is now,
and in anticipation that the winds of
current global financial crisis will subside
sooner than later.

The paper gave credence to recent
policy responses to curb the downturn.
Notwithstanding, additional areas of
focus should include, but not be limited
to innovative, forward-looking and
strengthened regulation; enhanced and
proactive supervision; modified legal
framework; advocacy for domestic
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